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Execution Against Land in New Brunswick
JOHN R. WILLIAMSON*
This article traces the development of the law of execution against 
land in New Brunswick. The two traditional methods of proceeding 
against land are examined in detail; that is, the judgment lien 
created on the registration of a memorial or delivery of a writ of 
fieri facias to the Sheriff. Particular attention is given to the 
problems of perfecting or realizing upon the lien of a judgment by 
the equitable order for sale method or by sale under the writ of 
fieri facias with relation back of title to the judgment lien. The 
problems and confusion caused by the decisions in Tobias v. Bob 
Wilson 8c Co. and by recent amendments to the Memorials and 
Executions Act will be considered. The possibility of a judgment 
creditor maintaining his priority against land will also be examined. 
Finally, some suggestions for reform in this unnecessarily complicated 
area of the law of execution will be made.
De quelle façon peut-on grever un bien-fonds au Nouveau-Brunswick? 
Cet article relate le développement et la position actuelle du droit 
à ce sujet. L'auteur traite en profondeur des deux moyens traditionnels: 
l’enregistrement d’un extrait de judgment et la remise entre les 
mains du shérif d’un bref de fieri facias. Cette étude porte sur les 
différents problèmes relevant de la vente d’un bien-fonds sous l’un 
ou l’autre de ces moyens. L'auteur analyse également les difficultés 
et la confusion occasionnées par la décision de l’arrêt Tobias v. 
Bob Wilson 8c Co. ainsi que par les récentes modifications de la 
Loi sur les extraits de jugem ent et les exécutions. On y 
examine la possibilité pour un créancier sur jugement de maintenir 
son rang prioritaire sur un bien-fonds. En guise de conclusion, 
l’auteur propose quelques idées de réforme qui pourraient simplifier 
ce domaine inutilement compliqué.
INTRODUCTION
T h e fact that a creditor obtains a judgm ent does not guarantee that 
he will be paid by the judgm ent debtor. T h e judgm ent creditor may 
have to take the steps necessary to get his money and the law o f 
execution provides the tools required for the judgm ent creditor to reach
*B .B .A ., 1971, L L .B ., 1973 (U .N .B .), LL .M ., 1974 (H arvard). Associate Professor, Faculty o f  Law, 
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his objective —  final payment. A standard procedure is the sale o f 
property o f the judgm ent debtor by the Sheriff, with the proceeds going 
to satisfy the judgm ent. O f the assets o f the judgm ent debtor, land is 
often the most valuable. Until recently, the procedures involved in 
executing against this land appeared quite straightforward. However, as 
a result o f  developments in case law and recent statutory amendments, 
there is now considerable uncertainty. This is truly unfortunate since, in 
many cases, land is the only asset o f  the judgm ent debtor o f significant 
value.
Despite its very broad title, this article will not examine all facets o f 
execution against land in New Brunswick. Important questions such as 
what interests in land are exigible, advertising requirements, and the 
forms to be used are not dealt with. This article deals primarily with the 
questions o f what interests are bound and subsequently sold by the 
judgm ent creditor; what procedural steps must be taken; and finally, 
what steps might be taken to maintain priority. In conclusion, 
suggestions will be made for reform in this unnecessarily complicated 
but important area o f execution law.
BACKGROUND1 
England
As with so much o f  the law o f New Brunswick, in order to 
understand the situation relating to execution against land today, one 
must go back hundreds o f years to the law o f  England.
At common law, in accordance with the policy o f the feudal law introduced 
into England after the conquest, the lands o f a debtor were not liable to the 
satisfaction o f a judgment against him except for debts due the King, and 
consequently no lien thereon is acquired under a judgm ent. In England this 
common law rule continued in force until the passage in 1285 o f the Statute 
o f Westminster II (13 Edward I), by which, in the interest o f trade and 
comm erce, the writ o f elegit was for the first time provided for, and by 
construction o f the courts it was held under this Act that the judgm ent was a 
lien on such lands from the date o f its rendition on the first day o f the term  
o f the court at which it was rendered.1
T h e writ o f  elegit created by the Statute of Westminster entitled the 
judgm ent creditor inter alia to possession o f one half o f the judgment 
debtor’s lands and the profits therefrom  until the debt was satisfied.3 It 
is important to realize that it was the judgm ent that created the lien and 
not the writ o f elegit itself.4 Both the nature and binding effect o f  this 
lien are significant.
'Som e o f  the m aterial for this section is taken from  a paper written by Richard J .  Scott for a 
Supplem entary W riting course at the University o f  New Brunsw ick Law School.
^Corpus Ju ru  Secundum, Vol. 4 9 , “Ju d gem en ts", 454  at 884 . (A uthorities om itted).
’ Blackstone, Sir W illiam , Commentaries on the Laws o f  England, Vol. I l l  (15th  ed .), at 4 1 8 -419 .
*Nortcliffe v. Warburton (1862), 31 L .J. Ch. (N .S.) 777 , at 782.
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It is true that the judgm ent was often spoken o f as being a lien upon the 
lands o f the defendant, but that onlv meant that under the Statute o f  
Westminster the plaintiff was entitled to have a moiety o f the lands put into 
his possession by the writ o f elegit and the judgm ent debtor would not by any 
means withdraw the lands from the operation o f the elegit. Also, a judgm ent 
creditor could come into equity to enforce his rights; but that was only after 
he had sued out his writ o f elegit. That was decided in the case o f  Neale v. 
Marlborough (5 Law J . Rep. (N.S.) Exch. Eq. 98).*
Thus, a judgm ent obtained against a debtor would bind land so that 
even if it were conveyed to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice 
o f  the judgm ent, the judgm ent creditor could still issue his writ o f  elegit 
and seize possession o f one half o f  the land. T h e reference to the role o f 
equity is further explained in the following quotation:
. . .  a court o f equity would not oblige a judgment creditor to wait until he is 
paid out o f  the rents, but would accelerate the payment by directing the sale 
o f the moiety.*
This fits within the general principle that a court o f equity would assist 
judgm ent creditors at common law where necessary. We shall see 
another application o f this principle later.
T h e lien o f the judgm ent originally related only to the writ o f  elegit 
under the Statute of Westminster, since that was the source o f its existence. 
It was later codified by the enactment o f  1 & 2 Victoria c. 110 in 1838. 
Under this statute, a judgment at both common law and equity created a 
general charge or lien on the lands o f the judgm ent debtor. Though the 
basis o f  the lien had changed, the mechanics o f perfecting that lien 
through the writ o f elegit remained unaffected.7 It was still the only writ 
available at the time in England which could reach the land o f the 
judgm ent debtor. T h ere was no need to worry about the binding effect 
o f  the writ o f  elegit on the land by itself. T h e lien o f the judgm ent always 
came into existence first and the title at the time could not be removed 
from the operation o f  a writ issued subsequently.
New Brunswick to 1786
From the beginning o f  English settlement in the Province, the law 
o f  the Colony was the law o f England at the time. This included the 
Statute of Westminster with its judgm ent lien and the writ o f  elegit as 
outlined above. This situation changed in 1732 when the Parliament in 
England passed 5 George II c. 7. Section 4 o f that Statute provided in 
part:
*Bond v. Bell (1857), 27 L .J. Ch. (N .S .) 2 3 3 . at 2 3 5 -236 .
*T ed d , W illiam, The Practice o f  the Courts o f  Kmgs Bench and Common Pleas, Vol. I I  (6th ed .), at 9 6 0 -962 . 
(A uthorities om itted).
7Bond v. BeU (1857), 27  L .J . Ch. (N .S .) 2 3 3 ; Nortcliffe v. Warburton (1862), 31 L .J. Ch. (N .S.) 777.
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T h a t . . .  the house, lands . . .  and other hereditaments and real estate, situate 
and being within any o f  the said plantations belonging to any person 
indebted, shall be liable to and chargeable with all just d eb ts ,. . .  owing by any 
such person to his Majesty or any o f  his subjects. . . .
T h e provision was taken to create a lien or charge on the lands o f the 
judgm ent debtor, though its exact nature may not have been clear.8 
However, the analogy to the force and effect o f  the Statute of Westminster 
seemed quite clear. It would appear natural that the lien created would 
be perfected by the issue o f a writ which would reach real estate. One 
might therefore expect to perfect this lien by using the writ o f  elegit. 
However, Section 4 o f this Imperial Statute went further to provide:
. . . lands o f the judgment debtor shall be subject to the like remedies, 
proceedings and process in any court o f law or equity, in any o f the said 
plantations respectively, for seizing, extending, selling o r disposing o f any 
such houses, lands, negroes, and other hereditaments and real estate, towards 
the satisfaction o f such devts, duties and demands, and in like m anner as 
personal estate in any o f the said plantations respectively are seized, extended  
sold or disposed of, for the satisfaction o f debts.
By virtue o f  this second part o f  Section 4, the writ o f  elegit was not the 
only common law writ o f execution to have the ability to reach land.
T h e usual means o f executing against personal estate o f the 
judgm ent debtor was the writ o f  fieri facias. This ancient common law 
writ directed the Sh eriff to seize and sell the goods and chattels o f  the 
judgm ent debtor to satisfy the judgm ent. As a result o f  Section 4 the 
Sheriff would now' be directed, in addition, to seize and sell the lands o f 
the judgm ent debtor.9 It would also seem logical that the lien o f  the 
judgm ent could now be perfected by the writ o f  fieri facias. I f  this were 
the case, then there was little sense in being concerned with the binding 
effect o f the writ o f  fieri facias on land by itself. At common law, the writ 
bound property from the time o f  issue and that would always be after 
the binding o f the judgm ent. T h e judgment and the writ o f  fieri facias 
would operate together as a single method o f  executing against land. It 
should be noted that for obvious reasons the writ o f  elegit would not be 
used any longer. It was far more effective and efficient to be able to sell 
the land under the writ o f  fieri facias rather than having only a right to 
one half possession under the writ o f elegit.
T h ere is not a great deal o f  authority on the effect o f  this statute in 
New Brunswick as new legislation was enacted soon after New 
Brunswick became a colony.
•Mills v. Mills (1858), 9 N.B.R. 45, at 46 (N.B.S.C.).
•LaForest, G.V. "Some Aspects o f  the Writ o f Fieri Facias", (1959) 12 U.N.B.L.J. 39, at 45-46.
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New Brunswick from 1786 to 1854
In 1786 the Colonial Legislature passed a statute entitled, “An Act 
Subjecting Real Estate in the Province of New Brunswick to the payment of 
Debts, and. directing the Sheriff in his proceedings thereon. ” In many respects 
26 George III  c. 12 re-enacted the provisions o f the earlier Imperial 
Statute. Section 1 o f the Colonial statute provided, for example, that:
. . . the Houses. Lands and Estate and Hereditaments, situate or being in any 
part o f this Province, belonging to any person or persons whatsoever, 
indebted, shall be liable to and chargeable with all just debts and demands, of  
what nature o r kind soever, owing by o r due from any such person to His 
Majesty, o r any o f his subjects, and shall be and are hereby made chattels for 
the satisfaction thereof in like m anner as personal Estate in the Province are  
seized, sold o r disposed of, for satisfaction o f debts.
T he lien o f the judgm ent was preserved and the treatment o f lands as 
personal property meant that the writ o f fieri facias continued to be 
available for the sale o f real estate. However, changes were starting to be 
made in the common law. Section 7 provided that no process against 
real estate could issue until one o f the judges o f the Supreme Court had 
inspected and certified the correctness o f the judgm ent, and the 
certified judgm ent and process were recorded in a book or Judgm ent 
Roll to be kept for that purpose by the Clerk o f  the Supreme Court. 
This provision was primarily for the benefit o f  the judgm ent debtor.
O f equal importance was the protection o f  a bona fide purchaser o f 
land o f a judgm ent debtor. As noted earlier, at common law the 
judgm ent bound from the first day o f  the term o f  the judgm ent. This 
situation left a bona fide purchaser no possible means o f  determining 
whether the land was subject to a judgm ent lien. T h e Legislature dealt 
with this problem in Sections 11 and 12 o f 26 George III  c. 14. All 
judges were required to date judgm ents when they were signed and they 
were to be treated as judgm ents only from that date. Further, Section 15 
stated that bona fide purchasers could not be prejudiced by the lien o f  a 
judgm ent until after the judgm ent had been placed on the Judgm ent 
Roll at full length.
Though the binding effect o f the judgm ent was being delayed and 
bona fide purchasers were being protected, there was still only one 
method o f executing against land. T h e writ o f  fieri facias could not be 
issued until after the judgm ent bound. By analogy to the Statute of 
Westminster, a sale o f land under a writ o f  fieri facias would relate back to 
or perfect the lien o f the judgm ent. This result was clearly confirmed by 
Section 5 o f 26 George I II  c. 12 which provided that the Sh eriffs  deed 
would vest in the purchaser o f the land at the Sh eriffs  sale:
. . .  as good and perfect an Estate as the owner o f  such Houses, Lands, Real 
Estate o r Hereditaments was seized of o r entitled unto at or before the said 
Ju d gm en t. . . ”.
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It should be emphasized that this provision is not the source o f  the 
doctrine o f  relation back o f  title but only recognizes it.
One strange aspect o f  the Legislation was the system o f priorities it 
created. I f  Judgm ent Creditor No. 1 (J.C. No. 1) obtained a judgm ent 
against Judgm ent Debtor (J.D .), his lien would bind the land o f J.D . 
immediately upon formal entry. I f  Judgm ent Creditor No. 2 (J.C. No. 2) 
then obtained a judgment against J.D ., his judgment lien would be 
subordinate to that o f J .C . No. 1. I f  J .C . No. 2 issued his writ o f  fieri 
facias and sold the land, one might question that title a purchaser at that 
Sh eriffs  sale would obtain. O ne’s first reaction would be that the 
purchaser would obtain title subject to J .C . No. 1’s judgm ent lien. 
However, s. 6 o f  the Act provided that:
. . . the purchaser (at the Sheriffs sale) . . . shall hold the premises purchased 
as aforesaid, free and clear o f all other judgments . . . .  by virtue w hereof no 
execution has been executed upon the real estate so purchased.
Thus, on the basis o f the statute, the purchaser obtained title free and 
clear o f the lien o f J .C . No. 1.
Subsequent changes in the legislation during this period focused on 
the certification and recording requirements. In 1827 under 8 George 
IV c. 7, the requirement that a judgment be entered at length before 
process could issue against land was dropped. T he public would now be 
protected by an alphabetical docket o f judgments to be kept by the 
Clerk. This was open to inspection and contained particulars o f  all 
judgments obtained in the Supreme Court. No judgment could bind 
lands and no execution could issue thereon until the judgm ent was 
entered and docketed.
T h e next development was also in 1827 with the introduction o f the 
memorial o f  a judgm ent. Under 8 George IV co. 8, a judgment could 
not bind lands as against purchasers or mortgagees for value until a 
memorial o f  the judgm ent containing prescribed information was 
registered in the appropriate county land registry office. This further 
protection for certain third parties did not affect in any way the existing 
priorities o f executions against land outlined in the above example. 
These provisions were o f a restrictive nature and in no way enlarged the 
scope o f  the lien o f a ju d gm ent.10 However, their effect was to create a 
separate method o f executing against land.
Until the introduction o f the requirement o f a memorial, the lien o f 
a judgm ent would always bind land before any binding effect o f a writ 
o f  fieri facias issued thereon. T h e  simple approach to executing against 
land was to sell under the writ o f fieri facias with title relating back to the 
prior lien o f the judgm ent. This basic approach was illustrated in 
Peabody v. McKnight.11 Now, however, it was quite possible that a
'°Supra, footnote 8, at 47.
" 2  N.B.R. 376 (N.B.C.A.).
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judgm ent could be properly docketed and entered but no memorial 
registered in the appropriate county Registry O ffice. A writ o f  fieri facias 
could be issued at this stage, delivered to the Sheriff and the land 
ultimately sold thereunder. Presumably, the land would be bound by the 
writ from the time o f  its delivery to the Sh eriff.12 A purchaser o f the 
land sold by the Sh eriff would get title as o f that time. T h ere  could be 
no relation back o f title to a judgm ent lien, at least in cases o f  bona fide 
purchasers, as there was no previously registered m em orial.13
T h e existence o f such a dual approach to execution against land was 
recognized by the New Brunswick Court o f Appeal in the 1843 case o f 
Nesmith v. Williston.14 This case dealt with a summary judgm ent which 
could not affect land under the existing legislation. However, the writ o f 
fieri facias could be issued on such a judgm ent and could be used to 
reach land. T h e  Court considered at some length the practice as to 
execution against land on Supreme Court judgm ents which did bind 
land. T h e Court stated that in such cases there could be . . two 
foundations o f  title to land sold under execution.”15 A judgm ent 
creditor might register a memorial which would cause the judgm ent to 
bind the property. Eventually this lien would be perfected by a writ o f 
fieri facias with the normal relation back o f  title. In the alternative, the 
judgm ent creditor might issue the writ o f fieri facias without previously 
registering a memorial. T h e Court in this case was faced with the issue 
o f what title was bound by the writ in such a case. It confirmed the 
conclusion reached above that the purchaser at the Sh eriffs  sale would 
obtain the title at the time the writ was delivered to the Sheriff. T h e 
stage is now set to look at the Revised Statutes o f 1854 which contained 
provisions that remained virtually unchanged until 1978.
New Brunswick 1854 - 1976
Revised Statutes 1854
Chapter 1 13 o f the Revised Statutes of New Brunswick, 1854, entitled, 
“Of Judgments, Execution, and Proceedings Thereon,” repealed, consolidated
' ’T h is  conclusion would have been reached on the basis o f  s. 1 o f  26  G eorge I I I  which, as we noted 
earlier, stated that land would be eligible in the same m anner as goods and chattels were in the 
Province. T h e  writ o f  ftert facias  would bind goods and chattels from  the time o f issuance at com m on 
law, but this was altered by the provisions o f  26  G eorge I I I ,  c. 14. Section 13 o f  that Act provided that 
goods and chattels could be bound only from  the tim e o f  delivery o f  the writ to  the Sh eriff.
,5A conflict seem ed to exist between this result and s. 5 o f  26  G eorge II I  s. 12 which stated that when 
land was sold under the execution  the purchaser at the S h e r iffs  sale obtained the title o f  the judgm ent 
debtor at o r before the tim e o f  the jud gem en t. By necessary im plication, the provision must be taken to 
have been am ended by this subsequent legislation relating to the requirem ent for th e registration o f  
m em orials.
'« (1843), 4 N .B .R . 459 .
"‘¡bid., at 462 (per Chipman C.J.)
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and revised all o f  those provisions previously discussed relating to 
execution against land. T h e requirement for docketing a judgm ent 
before land could be bound by the judgm ent or an execution issued 
thereon was retained in Section 1. T h e provisions in 26 George c. 141® 
relating to the requirement concerning the date o f signing judgm ent 
were dropped. They had become superfluous since Section 4 provided:
A memorial o f every such judgm ent, registered in the office o f the Registrar 
of Deeds in the County where the lands lie, or an execution thereon delivered 
to the Sheriff to be executed, shall bind the lands o f the person against whom 
the judgm ent was recovered o r the execution issued.
No judgm ent could bind land until a memorial was registered. Although 
Section 4 talked in terms o f  the memorial binding the land once 
registered, subsequent provisions indicated that it was still really the 
judgm ent lien that bound. Section 5 o f  the Act stated, for example:
Every judgm ent, o f which a memorial shall be registered, shall bind the lands 
o f the person against whom it was recovered. . . .
T h e dual approach to executing against land was clearly continued, 
as Section 6 provided:
The lands o f every person, his possessory right, and right o f entry may be 
seized and sold as personal estate to satisfy his debts. . . .
Further, Section 4 clarified that where the writ o f  fieri facias was used 
alone it bound land on delivery to the Sheriff.
T h e  only significant change seemed to be the question o f priorities. 
Previously, the judgm ent lien o f  J .C . No. 1 could be extinguished if the 
land was sold under J.C . No. 2 ’s execution first. This result was based on 
s. 6 o f  26 George c. 12. However, no equivalent provision was found in 
the Revised Statute. T h e effect o f this omission was dealt with by the 
New' Brunsw ick Court o f Appeal in Mills v. Mills.17 T h e facts o f  the case 
before the Court may be summarized as follows:
J.C . No. 1 obtained judgm ent and registered a memorial.
J .C . No. 2 obtained judgm ent, issued a writ o f fieri facias and 
two days later registered a memorial.
J .C . No. 2 proposed to sell the property under his writ o f  fieri 
facias.
T h e question to be decided was the title a purchaser at the proposed 
Sh eriffs  sale would obtain. In light o f the reference in Section 4 to the
'"T h e  revised Statute o f  Frauds was R .S .N .B . 1854, c. 123 entitled . “O f Frauds and Perjuries".
17(1858), 9 N.B.R. 45 (N.B.S.C.).
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memorial binding land and there being no provision equivalent to s. 5 o f 
26 George c. 12, the Court concluded that:
. . . a judgm ent, the memorial o f which has been registered in the county, has 
a priority as a charge on the land over a later judgment followed up by an 
execution.1®
This was clearly a m ajor change in priorities. Therefore, the purchaser 
at the Sh eriffs  sale under J.C . No. 2’s writ would take title subject to 
J .C . No. l ’s judgm ent lien.
Kerr v. Jamieson
T h ere  is one further provision in the Revised Statutes worth noting. 
T h e old legislation stated that the purchaser at the Sh eriffs  sale would 
get the title o f the judgm ent debtor “at or before the judgment”. This 
recognized the doctrine o f  relation back o f title but caused a potential 
problem 19 if  the writ o f  fieri facias were delivered to the Sheriff before a 
memorial, if  any, was registered. I f  there were no previously registered 
memorial, there could be no relation back o f title. Section 10 o f the new 
statute stated:
T he Sheriff shall execute to the purchaser a deed . .  . which shall be sufficient 
to convey all the interests o f  the person against whom such execution was 
issued.
This provision was broad enough to cover either the memorial method 
or the writ o f  fieri facias method of executing against land. T h e title 
conveyed by the Sh eriffs  deed would vary depending on the method 
used.
What effect did this change have on the doctrine o f relation back o f 
title? T h e answer to this question was given by the Court o f  Appeal in 
Kerr Jamieson.20 T h e relevant facts o f  the case in chronological order 
are as follows:
Judgm ent Creditor obtained a judgm ent and registered a memorial against 
Robert Jamieson at a time when he owned no real estate.
Robert Jamieson acquired title to the property.
Robert Jamieson transferred the property to John Jam ieson, the defendant in 
this case.
Writ of fier i facias  issued on the judgment.
"Ibid., at 47.
‘•See, supra, footnote 12.
*°(187l), 13 N.B.R. 446 (N.B.C.A.)
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Sheriff seized and sold the subject property under the writ o f fieri facias  to 
Robert Kerr.
Robert Kerr then leased the land to a Kerr, the plaintiff in this action.
T h e plaintiff claimed the right to possession o f the property pursuant to 
the Sh eriffs  sale under the writ. Joh n  Jam ieson claimed title under the 
deed from Robert Jam ieson which was executed prior to delivery o f the 
writ. T h ere was no argument that the property was not subject to the 
lien o f the judgm ent.21 T h e lien o f a judgm ent binds not only property 
owned by the judgm ent debtor at the time o f registration o f a memorial, 
but also property acquired after registration while the lien is still in 
force. T h e issue was what title had been conveyed to the purchaser at 
the Sh eriffs  sale. T h e defendant attempted to argue that the title 
conveyed was only the title bound at the time the writ was delivered to 
the Sheriff. Since his conveyance was prior to such delivery, he claimed 
the better title. T h e Court rejected that approach. Nothing in the 
Revised Statutes, including s. 10, changed the doctrine o f  relation back 
o f title. The Court’s conclusions on this point could not be clearer:
In the present case, we think that as soon as the grant issued to Robert 
Jamieson, the land became subject to the lien o f  the existing judgm ent, which 
then, by means o f the memorial, became a charge upon the land; and that 
when the execution issued upon that judgment, it had relation back, and 
defeated the conveyance to the defendant.22
Until the decision in 1974 in the case o f Tobias v. Bob Wilson &  Co.23 this 
procedure o f perfecting memorials by a sale under a writ o f  fieri facias 
with the doctrine o f  relation back o f  title seemed unquestioned.
Equitable Order for Sale
At this stage we should turn to the somewhat mysterious role o f the 
courts o f  equity in perfecting the liens o f  common law judgm ents. In 
England the Courts o f  Equity would assist a common law judgm ent 
creditor by ordering the sale o f land to accelerate recovery on the writ 
o f  elegit, rather than requiring him to wait to be satisfied out o f the 
profits o f  one half o f  the land. This function was not required in New 
Brunswick because the writ o f fieri facias reached land and provided for 
the sale by the Sheriff. T h e writ o f fieri facias, however, could not solve 
all problems which a judgm ent creditor might encounter in attempting
“ T h e  S h e r if f  s deed had recited the title o f  the jud gem ent debtor at the tim e the ju d gem en t was being 
conveyed. T h e  defendant claim ed that since the ju d gem en t debtor had no interest in the property at 
that tim e, the p laintiff would have no rights to  the property. T h e  court said that such a m isrecital did 
not affec the validity o f  the deed. It was stated, at p. 4 4 8 , that ‘‘[t]he intention o f  the law . .  . was that 
the deed should convey to the lessor o f  the plaintiff all the right and which the Robert Jam ieson had in 
the land which was bound by the jud gem en t and execution . . .".
ltlbtd., at 450 .
“ (1974), 8 N.B.R. (2d) 365 (N.B.Q.B.).
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to perfect the lien o f his judgm ent. Thus, the Court o f  Equity might 
give assistance to a common law judgm ent creditor by ordering the sale 
o f the land to perfect the lien o f the judgm ent. Two older New 
Brunswick cases indicate the restrictions on the exercise o f this 
jurisdiction by a court o f  equity. In the 1870 case o f Robertson v. Arm 
trong it was stated:
A decree will not be made for the sale o f  land bound by a memorial of  
judgm ent, unless the judgm ent nreditor shows some reason why he could not 
have obtained the fruit o f his judgm ent by n execution. When a judgm ent 
creditor has a legal charge, he must take all necessary proceedings at law to 
enforce his claim before he can ask th assistance o f a Court o f  Equity.14
In 1871 the New Brunswick Court o f  Appeal decided Black v. 
Hazen25 in which the above position was confirmed. In addition to the 
requirement that a judgm ent creditor exhaust his legal remedies, the 
Court indicated that there would have to be clear evidence that all 
personal property had been sold. This latter requirement was to en ure 
consistency with the sale o f land under the writ o ffieri facias. 26
Devebre v. Austin
T h e inter-relationship between the two methods o f  perfecting the 
lien o f  a judgm ent is well illustrated in the case o f  Devebre v. Austin27 
decided by the New Brunswicn Court o f  Appeal in 1875. T h e case 
focused on the scope and effect o f  various provisions o f the federal 
Insolvency Act28 o f 1869. One must have a general understanding o f  the 
statutory scheme under this legislation to appreciate the decision. An 
insolvent person would make an assignment in insolvency to the 
Assignee in Insolvency. T h e duties o f such an Assignee in Insolvency 
were largely the same as those o f  a Trustee in Bankruptcy today. T h e 
property o f  the insolvent person was to be liquidated with the proceeds 
to be distributed to those unsecured creditors entitled under the 
legislation. T h e rights o f secured creditors which had arisen before the 
assignment were unaffected. Therefore, the sale o f property by the 
Assignee would be subject to their security interest. Generally, the 
intention o f  the legislation seemed to be to place simple judgm ent
i *Robertson v. Armstrong, an unreported decision o f  Allen J .  in N ovem ber o f  1870; See Stevens, Jam es, 
Digest o f  New Brunswick Reports (3rd ed .) at 647 .
” (1971 ), 13 N .B .R . 272.
’ 'Section  6  o f  R .S .N .B ., 1854 c. 113 provided, inter alia “. . . but the S h er iff  to whom a writ o f fieri facias
is d irected shall not sell the lands until the personal estate, if any can be found, is exhausted . . .”
‘ ’(1875), 16 N.B.R. 55, at 66.
” (1869), S.C. 32-33 Viet. c. 16.
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creditors in the category o f  unsecured creditors. Section 59 o f the Act29 
provided that any lien created by a writ o f fieri facias issued by a 
judgm ent creditor was abolished but made no mention o f  a lien o f a 
judgm ent.
In the case at hand, the judgm ent creditor had obtained a judgm ent 
but had not issued a writ o f  fieri facias. He had, however, registered a 
memorial o f the judgment prior to the assignment. T h e issue was 
whether the lien o f the judgm ent survived the assignment so that any 
sale o f  land by the Assignee would be subject to this lien. What title then 
would the purchaser get from the Assignee? Section 48 o f the Act dealt 
w ith such a sale o f real estate by the Assignee:
All sales o f real estate so made by the Assignee, shall vest in the purchasers all 
the legal and equitable estate o f  the insolvent therein, and in all respects shall 
have the same effect as to mortgages, hypothecs o r privileges then existing 
thereon, as if the same had been made by a sheriff in the Province in whicb 
such real estate is situate, under a writ o f execution issued in the ordinary 
course, but no other, greater, o r less effect then such Sheriff s sale; . . . .
T h e section determines the title sold by using an analog) to a 
hypothetical Sh eriffs  sale in which the Assignee plays the role o f  the 
Sheriff. He sells title to the land as if it had been bound by the writ o f 
fieri facias at the time the Assignment was made. Secured creditor 
interests are preserved because the effect o f  the sale by the Assignee on 
“mortgages, hypothecs or privileges” is to be the same as a Sh eriffs sale 
under execution. A purchaser at such a Sh eriffs  sale would clearly take 
title subject to such “mortgages, hypothecs or privileges”. I f  there had 
been a w rit o f  fieri facias delivered to the Sh eriff prior to the delivery o f 
the writ under which the Sh eriff was selling land, then a purchaser 
would normally take title subject to that first writ. However, the 
analogy to a Sh eriffs  sale did not apply here when the Assignee sold the 
property since Section 59 abolished the lien created by a writ o f  fieri 
facias.
What would be the situation for a previously registered memorial, 
however? Two aspects o f this problem were discussed by the Court. 
First, though the lien o f  the judgm ent was not expressly abolished under 
s. 59, was it abolished by implication? O r was the lien o f a judgm ent in 
the class o f “privileges” and thus clearly preserved by that section? T h e 
Court examined the nature o f  the lien o f  a judgm ent carefully and 
concluded that clearer words would have to be used to abolish it:
’ •Section 59  o f  the federal Insolvents Act provided:
No lien o r privilege upon either the personal o r  real estate o f  the Insolvent shall be created for the 
am ount o f  any ju d gem en t debt, o r o f  the interest thereon, by the issue o r delivery to the S h eriff o f  any 
writ o f  execution , o r by levying o r seizing under such writ, the effect o r estate o f  the Insolvent, if  before 
the paym ent over to the p lain tiff o f  the moneys actually levied under such writ, the estate o f  the debtor 
shall have been assigned to an interim  Assignee, o r shall have been placed in com pulsory liquidation 
und er this A c t ; . .  .
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. . .  By the Revised Statutes, chap. 113, it is contemplated that the lien o f a 
judgm ent created by the registry o f a memorial, may be a continuing security
—  in fact, it becomes a kind o f statutory mortgage on the debtor’s land, which 
binds it for five years, at all events, and may be continued beyond that time 
by re-registering the memorial, if the judgm ent creditor does not wish to 
enforce it. T o  destroy this security, and place the judgm ent creditor in the 
situation o f a person who had taken no security, and was only entitled to a 
pro rata dividend of the insolvent’s estate, would be entirely opposed to the 
express provisions o f our Statute, and cannot be done unless such an 
intention is shewn by the clear and irrestible language o f the Insolvent Act.30
At this stage the court determined that the lien o f the “memorial” could 
be in the category o f a “privilege” under s. 48.
Secondly, would the lien o f a previously registered memorial survive 
a S h e r iff  s sale under a subsequent writ o f  fieri facias issued on a second 
judgment? T h e Court had no difficulty in reaching its conclusion.
Again, the sale is to vest in the purchaser exactly the same estate which a 
Sheriffs deed would vest if the property had been sold under an execution.
Then what estate would a Sheriffs deed have vested in the purchaser if an 
execution had issued on this hypothetical judgm ent and the land been sold. 
Clearly, not an absolute estate: but an estate subject to the judgm ent o f a 
memorial which had been registered prior to the Assignment in Insolvency, 
the only interest which the judgm ent debtor had —  as was decided in Mills v.
Mills.3'
It cannot be overemphasized that this statement from Devebre v. Austin 
and Mills v. Mills32 itself, dealt with a situation where there were two 
separate and distinct judgm ents.
T h e Assignee made one last argument in favour o f his position that 
the lien o f the judgment had effectively been abolished by implication 
from the statutory scheme. Section 59 had the effect o f  requiring all 
proceeds from the sale o f property under the writ o f fieri facias to be 
distributed among the unsecured creditors. Since the lien o f the 
memorial would be perfected by a sale under a writ o f fieri facias, as a 
practical matter, there could be no priority for the lien. T herefore, the 
Assignee argued, the lien created by the registration o f the memorial 
must have been intended to be abolished. T h e Court rejected that 
argument since it was based on the assumption that the only method o f 
perfecting the lien o f a judgment was by the writ oifieri facias:
If, for the purpose o f  perfecting his lien, the plaintiff should issue an 
execution on his judgm ent, and should then be met by the impediment 
created by the Insolvent Act to the exercise of his legal rights, we think he 
would have made out a case to ask the interference o f a Court o f Equity;
30D n ’fbre v. Austin (1875), 16 N .B .R . 55  (N .B .C .A .).
"Ibid., at 70.
” (1858), 9 N.B.R. 45 (N.B.S.C.)
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because he would have shewn that he had a right, by virtue o f his judgm ent, 
but that, in consequence o f  the defendant’s insolvency, he could not obtain 
satisfaction o f it in the Court o f Law by the ordinary process o f execution.33
T h e Court reached this conclusion despite arguments by the Assignee 
that such a result would be equivalent to the court repealing the Federal 
statute.
Massey-H arris Co. v. Whitehead.
One final case to examine in this period o f development is 
Massey-Harris Co. v. Whitehead,34 Unfortunately, the facts involved some 
confusing aspects which must be dealt with before the significance o f 
this decision for the perfection o f memorials can be understood. T h e 
plaintiff company obtained a judgm ent against the judgm ent debtor, 
Amasa C. Whitehead, and registered a memorial in the appropriate 
County Registry Office. At the time o f registration, the judgm ent debtor 
owned the property in question. T h e memorial was renewed on two 
occasions and while subject to the renewed memorial the judgm ent 
debtor conveyed the property to the defendant in this case, Barry J .  
Whitehead. T h e judgm ent debtor then died intestate, and as found by 
the trial judge, without personal property. No administrator o f his estate 
had been appointed when the plaintiff company made its application by 
way o f originating summons. T h e  plaintiff was seeking a declaration that 
the land was subject to the lien o f its memorial. No writ o f  fieri facias had 
been issued prior to the plaintiff s application.
On the basis o f the above facts, what would be the normal 
procedure for a judgm ent creditor to follow to perfect the lien o f his 
judgment? O rder 42, r. 23(a) o f the New Brunswick Rules o f  Court 
requires that a judgment creditor obtain leave o f the court before 
issuing a w rit o f  fieri facias after the death o f the judgm ent debtor. 
Normally, in a case where the judgm ent debtor died intestate, leave 
would not be granted until an administrator had been appointed. As was 
stated in the decision:
Under the old practice the validity o f a claim against an estate could only
have been investigated after a decree for administration has been m ade.35
T h e significance o f such a decree for administration would be to allow a 
court to grant leave to the judgm ent creditor to issue his writ o f fieri 
facias. However, O rder 55, r. 3 apparently contemplated another means 
o f  reaching this result. Under this provision, any creditor o f  a deceased 
person could apply by originating summons to a Judge for a
3iSupra, footnote 30 , at 71.
S4( 1923), 51 N .B .R . 282  (N.B.C..A.)
Silbtd., at 288.
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determination o f any question affecting the rights or interest o f the 
person claiming to be a creditor and make a declaration accordingly 
without an administrator o f the estate being appointed. T h e  defendant, 
Barry J .  Whitehead, contested the right o f the trial judge to make his 
declaration under this provision. T h e court stated however:
T h e effect o f the rule is, in my opinion, to change the law, and give to 
creditors . .  . claiming any o f the relief mentioned in the rule, the right to 
have their claims adjudicated upon and determined without an administrator 
o f the estate or trust.38
Once such a determination was made under O. 55 r. 3, the next step for 
a judgm ent creditor would normally be an application for leave to issue 
a writ o f fieri facias. T h e  writ could then be used to perfect the lien o f 
the memorial in the usual manner.
However, this did not happen in Massey-Harris Co. v. Whitehead. T he 
trial judge made the declaration under O. 55, r. 3 and immediately 
exercised his equitable jurisdiction and ordered the sale o f  the land to 
satisfy the lien o f the judgm ent. O ne o f the grounds o f  appeal in the 
defendant’s brief was:
4. The Court has no authority to interfere. T he plaintiff should proceed to 
revive his judgm ent and sell the lands under execution.37
Such an objection would appear to be very well founded in light o f 
earlier cases such as Black v. Hazen. 38 T h e Appeal Court, however, 
rejected this proposition in the following very important paragraph:
Before the Judicature Act, when the jurisdiction exercisable by Courts o f  
Equity and that exercisable by the Courts o f common law was clearly defined, 
a judgm ent creditor who had obtained a lien on the lands o f  his debtor by 
registering a memorial o f judgm ent, could not enforce his lien in a Court o f  
Equity until he had exhausted his remedies at law: Black v. Hazen. But now by 
the Judicature Act, law and equity are to be administered concurrently and in 
all matters in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules o f  
equity and the rules o f  the common law, with reference to the same m atter, 
the rules o f equity shall prevail.39
T h e trial judge was, therefore, acting properly when he ordered the sale 
even before the writ o f  fieri facias had been issued and without any 
evidence o f an impediment to perfecting the lien by that method. T h e 
Appeal Court did, however, confirm that the equitable order for sale 
would not be given unless it were clear that the property could have 
been sold under the writ o f  fieri facias. In this case, the evidence
3tibui.
J ,/M „ at 285.
” (1871), IS  N .B .R . 272  (N .B .C .A .).
s*Massey-Harns Co. v. Whitehead (1923), 51 N .B .R . 282 , at 28 8  (Citations om itted).
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indicated that there was no personal property and therefore the 
equitable order for sale was proper.
Despite the somewhat confused fact situation and the complications 
centering around the requirement for an administrator o f  the estate, it 
appears clear that this case makes a dramatic change in the mechanics o f 
perfecting the lien o f  a judgment. One would apparently have the 
option o f using either the equitable order method or the fieri facias 
method. In most cases the most efficient and least expensive method 
would be the writ o f fieri facias. On the other hand, there may be some 
advantage is using the equitable order method, as will be discussed later.
Summary
At this stage in the development o f  the law relating to execution 
against land in New Brunswick, the rules and procedures appeared clear 
and settled. T here were two separate, distinct and independent methods. 
First a judgment creditor could use a writ o f  fieri facias alone to bind, 
seize and sell land. Second, a judgment creditor could register a 
memorial. T h e lien o f  the judgment thereby created could then be 
perfected in one o f two ways, more or less at the option o f  the judgm ent 
creditor. T h e  judgment creditor could issue a writ o f  fieri facias and have 
the land sold thereunder with title relating back to the memorial. In the 
alternative, the judgm ent creditor could perfect the lien o f  the judgm ent 
by an equitable order. Now it is time to turn to the first o f  the two 
decisions involving the case o f Tobias v. Bob Wilson £s? Co.40
1974 — Tobias v. Bob Wilson Co. Ltd.
In 1974, the relevant provisions o f  the Memorials and Executions Act41 
had undergone few changes from the statutory provisions in force when 
cases such as Kerr v. Jamieson42 and Devebre v. Austin43 were decided. 
Section 5 o f  the Act stated:
A memorial o f  judgm ent . . .  o r a writ o f  fieri facias . . . binds the lands o f  the 
person against whom the judgment was recovered o r decree made or 
execution issued.
Section 6 o f the Act stated:
Every judgm ent or decree o f which a memorial is so registered binds the 
lands o f  the person against whom the judgment o r decree was recovered. . . .
«•(1974), 8  N .B .R . (2d) 365 (N .B .Q .B .).
«■R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-9.
«(1871), 13 N.B.R. 466 (N.B.C.A.).
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Section 11 o f  the Act stated:
T he lands o f a person may be seized and sold under execution as personal 
estate to satisfy his debts. . .  .
Section 15 o f the Act stated:
T h e sheriff shall execute to the purchaser a deed . . .  o f lands sold by him 
under execution reciting the execution under which the same were so 
sold . .  . which shall be sufficient to convey all the interest o f the person 
against whom the execution was issued. . .  .
Following is a chronological summary o f the relevant facts in the 
case o f  Tobias v. Bob Wilson fc? Co. Ltd.:
(1) March 4, 1948 —  subject property conveyed to John  Wilson and Robert 
Wilson as joint tenants.
(2) August 13, 1963 —  subject property was mortgaged to Eastern Trust —  
now Canada Permanent Trust.
(3) Ju n e 10, 1968 —  judgm ent against Robert Wilson and his limited 
company.
(4) June 12, 1968 —  memorial o f judgm ent registered.
(5) July 16, 1969 —  lease to M artin-Senour Co. Ltd. executed by John Wilson 
and Robert Wilson.
(6) August 13, 1969 —  lease to Peacocks Flower Shop Limited executed by 
John Wilson and Robert Wilson.
(7) February 15, 1972 — John Wilson conveyed his one-half interest in the 
subject property to Robert Wilson.
(8) February 25, 1972 —  Robert Wilson et ux mortgaged the subject property 
to John Wilson.
(9) July 21, 1972 —  Robert Wilson conveyed the subject property to himself 
and his wife as joint tenants.
(10) December 20 , 1971 —  a second memorial o f the June 10, 1968 
judgment was registered.
(11)  February 15, 1973 —  a writ o ffieri facias  was delivered to the Sheriff.
T h e Sh eriff proposed to sell the property at public auction on May 1, 
1973 but a question arose as to the interest in the property that would 
be sold. T h e judgment debtor made an application for a determination 
o f  that question. Stevenson J .  acceded to the request, stating:
It seems to be in the interests o f  the efficient administration o f  justice to 
determine such issues before rather than after a sale.44
■*■*( 1974), 8 N.B.R. (2d) 365, at 369.
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Before undertaking a detailed examination o f the decision, some o f 
the peripheral issues raised by the farts o f  the case should be eliminated. 
First, there was no problem with »he exigibility o f an equity o f 
redemption in land. Section 1 o f the Memorial and Execution Act defines 
land as including inter alia . . the equity o f redemption o f a mortgagor 
who is a judgment d e b to r . . .”. Second, although there is some 
authority45 questioning the exigibility o f a jo in t tenant’s interest in land, 
Stevenson J .  clearly decided that it was exigible.46 He also followed 
authorities47 to the effect that upon sale by the Sheriff, the jo in t interest 
is terminated and becomes a tenancy in common. Third , the leases were 
given in part by Joh n  Wilson whose interest in the land was not subject 
to the lien o f the judgm ent, therefore, the tenants’ interests were 
probably not fully subject to the lien. One final problem was the effect 
o f the mortgage back to John  Wilson from Robert Wilson. Would the 
after acquired property aspects o f the memorial catch and bind the 
one-half interest in the property conveyed to Robert Wilson before the 
mortgage back to Joh n  Wilson? T h e answer would normally be yes. 
However, if it could be shown to be a purchase money mortgage, there 
is a line o f authority48 to the effect that the memorial would only bind 
the equity o f redemption in the interest conveyed to Robert Wilson. As a 
result o f  the decision reached by Stevenson J .  in this case, this question 
did not have to be answered.49
On the basis o f the facts, the above comments and ignoring the 
leases, what would be the interest bound by the memorial o f judgm ent. 
Previous authorities would seem to suggest that it would be:
(a) the original one-half interest owned by Robert Wilson at the time o f  
registration o f  the memorial subject only to the mortgage to Canada 
Permanent M ortgage Company.
plus
(b) the one-half interest acquired from John Wilson also subject to the 
Canada Permanent Mortgage and possibly the mortgage to John Wilson if it 
were a true purchase money mortgage.
Further, on the basis o f previous authorities, the lien o f  the judgment 
should be perfected by the sale o f the property under the writ o f  fieri 
facias. This is in fact what the judgm ent creditor was attempting to do.
« T h ir d  Report o f  the C onsum er Protection Project. Vol. I I ,  Legal Remedies o f  the Unsecured Creditor 
After judgement, by Robert W. K err. O ctober 1976, Published by the Province o f  New Brunswick, at
16.
**Supra, footnote 44 , at 372.
47Power v. Grace, [1932] 2 D .L.R. 793 (O nt. C .A .).
41S'eiitt v. McMurray, (1886 ) 14 O .A .R . 126 (Ont. C .A .); McMillan v. Munro, (1898 ) 25 O .A .R . 288  (O nt.
C .A .).
**Supra, footnote 46.
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However, Stevenson J .  did not treat the sale under the writ as perfecting 
the lien o f a memorial, but as if  it were a sale under a writ o f fieri facias 
by itself. As authority for this approach Stevenson J .  made the following 
statement:
If an execution issues on a judgm ent a memorial of-which has been registered 
and the debtors land is sold pursuant to the execution, the Sheriffs deed does 
not vest in the purchaser an absolute estate but only an estate subject to the 
judgm ent, that being the only interest the judgm ent debtor has Devebre v.
Austin. 50
T h ere is no question that the statement was made in Devebre v. 
Austin, but not in the context o f  a single judgm ent with a registered 
memorial and a subsequent writ o f  fieri facias. That decision, as 
emphasized previously, involved a hypothetical Sh eriffs sale with two 
separate judgm ents. T h e first judgm ent had a registered memorial and 
the second judgm ent had the writ o f  fieri facias issued thereon under 
which the property was sold. This statement taken out o f context led 
Stevenson J .  to the conclusion that the interest to be sold at the S h eriff s 
sale was that bound at the time o f the delivery o f  the writ o f  fieri facias 
to the Sheriff. This meant that any purchaser would buy the property 
subject to the lien o f  the same judgm ent creditor’s memorial since the 
sale had in no way perfected that lien. As to how that lien would be 
perfected, Stevenson J .  suggested the following:
It will be asked —  how is the lien o f  a memorial of judgment enforced? While 
it is not necessary for me to do so I would refer to O rder 51, rule 1 and also 
to O rder 55, rule 3 and the case o f Massey-Harris Co. v. Whitehead. 5I
This statement would appear to allude to an equitable order for the 
sale o f  the property to perfect the lien o f the judgment. T h e clear 
inference is therefore that such an equitable order is the only method 
now available to perfect the lien o f the judgm ent and that it could be 
obtained at any time upon proper application.
T h e attempt to sell under the writ o f fieri facias was abandoned in 
this case and the judgm ent creditor attempted to get an equitable order 
for sale. In Tobias v. Bob Wilson Co. No. 2 ,52 which will be discussed in 
detail later, Stevenson J .  expressed surprise that the judgm ent creditor 
had not sold the property under the writ o f  fieri facias. However, in light 
o f his previous decision, that would seem understandable since any 
purchaser at the Sh eriffs  sale would take subject to the lien o f the 
memorial. For example, assume a property is worth $10,000 free o f any 
liens or encumbrances and that a memorial is registered against it for 
$20,000. No one would pay anything for the property at a Sh eriffs  sale
stlbid., at 371.
"Ibid., at 373.
“ (1976), 13 N.B.R. (2d) 20, at 25 (N.B.Q.B.).
150 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
under a writ o f  fieri facias subsequently issued on that judgm ent. 
W hereas one would expect the property to be sold only once to satisfy 
the debt, now it could be sold twice; once under the writ o f fieri facias 
and again by equitable order. It would almost be the same as asking 
someone to buy a $10,000 property that had a $20,000 mortgage on it.53
Can such a result be correct, either on the basis o f the authorities 
we have reviewed or on the basis o f common sense? It would seem that 
the decision is incorrect on both points particularly in light o f Kerr v. 
Jamieson. 54 This is not to say, however, that the decision can be ignored 
since it is the most recent authority in this Province dealing with the 
question o f perfecting memorials. Further, there is a possible ground for 
the decision which was not discussed in the reasons for judgm ent 
although the provision was cited. Section 20(1) o f the Memorials and 
Executions Act read as follows:
The effect o f the sale and conveyance under execution o f  an equity o f  
redemption in lands shall be to vest in the purchaser, his heirs and assigns, all 
the interest o f  the m ortgagor therein at the time the writ was delivered to the 
sheriff to be executed, as well as at the time o f the sale, and also the same 
rights as the m ortgagor would have had if the sale had not taken place.
Read in isolation, one could conclude that this provision requires, in all 
cases, that a purchaser at a Sh eriffs  sale under a writ o f fieri facias can 
only obtain title to the equity o f  redemption determined from the time 
o f  delivery o f the writ to the Sheriff. It should be remembered that at 
common law, an equity o f  redemption was not exigible. In 1903 our 
legislation was amended so as to redefine “land” to include an equity o f 
redemption in land.55 One o f the problems with equities o f redemption 
involved the contractual rights under the mortgage which would 
ultimately determine the mortgagor’s right to redeem. Normally, a sale 
under a writ o f fieri facias would convey only proprietary rights and not 
such contractual rights. T o  solve this problem, the final clause o f s. 20(1) 
ensures the transfer o f  all rights, both proprietary and contractual. 
Sections 20(2) and 21 make further provisions as to the rights o f  a 
purchaser o f  the equity o f redemption. T h e solution to the problem o f 
contractual rights seems to be the primary purpose o f  Sections 20 and 
21 .
Can s. 20(1) justify the decision reached by Stevenson J .?  Could the 
reference in s. 20(1) to the title at the time o f delivery o f  the writ to the 
Sheriff have been intended to abolish the doctrine o f  relation back o f 
title in cases o f equities o f  redemptions? I f  so, an anomaliy would exist
S3T h e  problem  exists only if the value o f  the property is less than the am ount o f  the judgem ent. I f  the 
property is worth $ 2 1 ,0 0 0  and the ju d gem en t is for $ 2 0 ,0 0 0 , a purchaser would pay $ 2 1 .(KM) since the 
$ 2 0 ,0 0 0  would elim inate the lien o f  the m em orial.
S4( I 8 7 I ) ,  IS  N .B .R . 44 6  (N .B.C .A .).
“ R.S.N.B. 1903, C.-128, s. 1.
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with cases where the land sold was free from any mortgage. It is not 
impossible that the doctrine o f  relation back o f title was eliminated in 
the case o f an equity o f  redemption, but there does not appear to be a 
good reason why this would be done. It makes far more sense to treat s. 
20(1) as applying only to cases where the writ o f  fieri facias is used by 
itself. Any drastic change in the law which would clearly create 
anomalies should only occur after clear statutory direction.
T h ere is an even stronger argument that Section 20(1) could not 
have abolished the doctrine o f relation back o f title in cases o f equities o f 
redemption. It rests on the theoretical basis for the doctrine itself. It is 
submitted that the doctrine does not depend in any way on statutory 
authority; especially provisions such as s. 15 and s. 20(1) o f the statute. 
It depends on the meaning o f  a judgm ent binding land and can be 
traced to the Statute of Westminster and the writ o f elegit in England. T h e 
decision o f the New Brunswick Court o f  Appeal in Devebre v. Austin56 is 
very instructive in this regard. Following are a few excerpts from that 
decision:
Now what is meant by this expression, “binds the lands"? . . .  It seems to us 
th a t . .  . when a memorial o f a judgm ent is duly recorded, it creates a charge  
upon the land, and that the judgment debtor, though he still continues to be 
the legal owner, cannot dispose o f the land except subject to the payment o f  
the judgm ent. Unless the Act means that, we are at a loss to know what it 
does m ean.57
And further in the next paragraph:
Independently o f  our Statute, the lands were bound at comm on law from the 
time o f  signing the judgm ent, so that execution could be had o f them though the 
debtor aliened bona fid e  before execution sued out: Tidd's Pr. 968. In Cruise’s Dig.
Title XIV, Sec. 47, it is said that “a judgm ent binds all lands whereof tbe 
debtor was seized at the time when the judgm ent was entered, or which he 
afterwards acquires, and no subsequent act o f  his, not even an alienation for a 
valuable consideration to a purchaser without notice o f the judgm ent, will 
avoid it.” This doctrine was acted on by this Court in Doe dem. Kerr v. - 
Jamieson. U nder the Statute o f Westminster, the judgment debtor could not 
withdraw his land from the operation o f the writ o f  elegit: Bond v. Bell. This 
rule o f  the common law was limited and restrained by our Act, which declared 
that judgments should only be binding against subsequent purchasers from  
the time o f the registry o f a memorial. But when a memorial was registered, 
no subsequent conveyance by the judgment debtor could avoid the judgm ent, 
nor could he, by any subsequent act, withdraw his land from the operation o f  
it.48 (Kmphasis added; citation omitted.)
It is submitted that the doctrine o f  relation back o f  title to the 
registration o f  the memorial as applied in Kerr v. Jamieson™ rests today
“ (1875), 10 N .B .R . 55 (N .B .C .A .).
"Ibid., at 66-67 .
58Ibid., at 67  (Citation om itted).
” (1871), 13 N.B.R. 446 (N.B.C.A.).
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on s. 5 o f the ¿Memorials and Executions Act and not on provisions such as 
Sections 15 and 20. T h e  possibility that subsequent cases will treat Tobias 
v. Bob Wilson £*? Co. No. 1 as standing for the proposition that the 
doctrine o f  relation back o f title depends on Section 15 or 20 is the 
greatest danger o f  the decision in light o f subsequent amendments to 
those sections.
In conclusion, the effect o f  Tobias v. Bob Wilson Co. No. I is 
unclear but cannot be ignored since it represents the most recent 
pronouncements on the subject in the Province. On initial reading, the 
decision does not recognize the existence o f the doctrine o f  relation back 
o f title to a memorial. This position appears untenable in light o f 
previous authority. T h e alternate ground for the decision, s. 20(1) 
dealing with the effect o f the sale o f  an equity o f redemption, appears to 
be unacceptable also. Aside from the fact that an anomolous situation 
would be created, such a position would suggest that the doctrine o f 
relation back o f  title rests on such statutory provisions. However, as just 
indicated, the basis o f  the doctrine is the provision in s. 5 o f  the 
Memorials and Executions Act stating that upon registration o f a memorial, 
a judgment "binds” land o f the judgment debtor. T h e common law 
doctrine o f  relation back o f  title would then come into effect. T h e 
principle purpose and effect o f s. 20 would be o f  a housekeeping nature 
to ensure a proper transfer o f  both proprietary and contractual rights 
under the mortgage. It is, therefore, this writer’s view that the common 
law doctrine o f  relation back o f title continues in all situations despite 
the decision in Tobias v. Bob Wilson Co. No. 1.
TOBIAS V. BOB WILSON fcf CO. No. 2 60
After the first decision, the attempt by the judgm ent creditor to 
have the land sold under the writ o f  fieri facias was abandoned. In this 
second case, an application was made to have the Court exercise its 
equitable jurisdiction to have the land sold to satisfy the lien o f the 
memorial. Mr. Justice Stevenson had no problem in deciding that he 
had the power to make such an order,61 but refused to do so in the 
circumstances o f this case on the grounds that Black v. Hazen62 required 
that all legal remedies must have been exhausted first. This decision 
seems to be contrary to the Court o f Appeal decision in Massey-Harris Co. 
v. Whitehead63 discussed in detail earlier. As noted, that decision 
appeared to overrule Black v. Hazen on the basis o f  the merging o f  law 
and equity under the Judicature Act. Mr. Justice Stevenson’s decision is
*#( 1976), IS  N .B .R  (2d) 20 , al 21 (N .B .Q .B .). 
•'Ibid., at 24-25 .
6i( 1871), IS N.B.R. 272 (N.B.C.A.).
*3( 1923). 51 N.B.R. 282 (N.B.C.A.).
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even more surprising as it indicates that there must be a sale under the 
writ o f fieri facias which would be an attempt to perfect the lien o f the 
memorial. T hat proposition seems totally contrary to his approach in the 
first decision.64 Even if Black v. Hazen were applicable, it would seem 
reasonable that a judgm ent creditor would be entitled to an equitable 
order if he could show that a sale under the writ o f  fieri facias would be 
a futile effort. T o  require such a time consuming and costly attempt at a 
sale seems totally unnecessary. It is this writer’s opinion that this decision 
cannot stand in light o f previous authority.
AMENDMENTS TO MEMORIALS AND EXECUTIONS ACT 
Writ of Fieri Facias Method
Since the decisions in Tobias v. Bob Wilson & Co., there have been 
several amendments to the Memorials and Executions Act with respect to 
execution against land in New Brunswick. Until September 1, 1978. 
Section 5 o f that Act had provided that:
. . .  a writ o f fieri facias issued . . . and delivered to the sheriff to be executed, 
binds the lands o f the person against whom . .  . the execution issued.
As o f the above date, the section was amended to read as follows:85
5. A memorial o f  a judgment obtained in the Supreme Court, or o f  a decree 
of T he Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes providing for the payment 
o f alimony or other money, o r o f  a judgment obtained in the County Court 
registered in the registry office o f the county in which the lands are situated, 
binds the lands o f the person against whom whe judgment was recovered, 
decree made o r execution issued, but no writ o f fier i facias  issued on such 
judgm ent o r decree, and delivered to the sheriff to be executed shall bind 
such lands.®8
T h e purpose and effect o f  the amendment was stated in the 
Explanatory Notes to the Bill to be as follows:
This amendment takes away the binding effect o f a writ o f  fieri fac ia s , but a 
memorial o f judgm ent will continue to bind land. This will do away with the 
necessity o f checking the Sheriffs records to determine if real property is 
bound by a writ o f fieri facias.
•4T h is  apparent inconsistency may be explained if  Stevenson J .  has interpreted Black v. Hazen as 
requiring that all legal steps be taken to satisfy the ju d gem en t, rather than that all legal steps be taken 
to perfect the lien o f  the ju d gem en t on the land. Such an approach to Black v. Haien  is unfounded in 
cases o f  ju d gem en t liens. T h e  principle was for the removal o f  an inpedim ent to exec ution at com m on 
law.
• 'T h e re feren ce to "o r executions issued" im mediately prior to the last com m an in the section should 
not be th ere since this new provixion deals only with m em orials o f  jud gem ents.
” 1978 S.N.B., C.-37, s. 2.
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On Septem ber 1, 1978 when the provision came into effect, it was 
conceivable that a judgm ent creditor could have previously delivered a 
writ o f  fieri facias to the Sheriff and not have registered a memorial. 
Serious questions arose with this amendment. Was the lien o f all writs o f 
fieri facias now abolished? O r was the amendment to prevent only writs 
delivered to the Sheriff after September 1, 1978 from binding land.'' 
W'hat would be the status o f a writ delivered to the Sheriff before 
September 1, 1978 but renewed after that date? T h e Explanatory Note 
would seem to require the conclusion that all writs o f  fieri facias ceased 
to bind land on that date. However, there is a recent decision in which 
the opposite conclusion was reached.
In Attorney-General of Canada v. Boucher et al,67 the Attorney-General 
had delivered the writ o f  fieri facias to the Sheriff in October o f 1959. 
T h e writ was renewed faithfully, the last renewal being on Ju n e 19, 
1979.88 T h e Attorney-General sought a declaration that the writ o f fieri 
facias continued to bind the land with priority tracing to the delivery o f 
the w rit to the Sheriff in 1959. T h e argument against such a proposition 
was that the effect o f  the amendment to s. 5 was the termination o f any 
lien o f the writ, particularly where the present status depended upon a 
renewal after September 1, 1978. After reviewing authorities on the 
question o f  statutory interpretation, Meldrum J .  concluded:
1 can not find any indication in the legislation to suggest an intention to make 
it retrospective. Without a clear and unequivocal wording I can not read the 
section so as to eliminate rights which may otherwise have vested in the 
Crown in right o f Canada as a result o f the judgment and execution.89
Thus a writ delivered to the Sheriff before Septem ber 1, 1978 and 
validly renewed will continue to bind land in this Province. Therefore, a 
lawyer acting for the purchaser o f real estate would still be well advised 
to obtain a Sh eriffs  certificate for some time to come despite the 
declared intention o f the amendment.
In addition to the above transitional problem, the amendment to s. 
5 raises questions as to the status o f what previously had been a separate 
method o f executing against land. Can one say that the separate method 
o f using the writ o f fieri facias alone still exists? Theoretically the answer 
is yes. Section II o f  the Memorials and Executions Act was unaffected by 
the 1978 amendments. That section continues to provide that:
* 7(1980), 28  N .B .R . (2d) 213 (N .B .Q .B .).
" T h e  issue o f  th e effect o f s. 2 o f  the Limitation oj Actions Act, R .S .N .B . 1973, c. L-8, stating that: “No 
action . . . upon any ju d g e m e n t. .  . shall be brought but within twenty years after the cause o f  action 
arose". In view o f  the apparent lack o f  a lim itations period under the federal legislation, it would 
appear that this provincial section would apply pursuant to the Federal Court Act R .S.C . 1970 2nd Supp., 
c. 10. s. 56. T h is  is fu rth er assum ing that on the facts th ere were no grounds for extending the 
limitation. "A ction ” is defined under the Limitations o f  Actions Act to include "any civil proceeding”. 
“P n x eed in g " is defined to include inter alis "sale proceedings under an o rd er o f  a cou rt”.
••Attorney-General o f  Canada v. Boucher et al., (1980), 28 N.B.R. (2d) 213, at 216 (N.B.Q.B.).
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T he lands o f a person may be seized and sold under execution as personal
estate to satisfy his d eb ts .. . .
As a practical matter, however, the answer is no. T h e recent 
amendments force the judgm ent creditor to proceed by the memorial o f 
judgm ent route. This is due to the delay in the binding o f the writ and 
the effect on the title sold by the Sheriff. Clearly, the Sh eriff can seize 
real estate under a writ o f fieri facias, the writ itself directs him to. But 
what interest is to be sold? Surely the amendment to s. 5 was not 
intended to have the effect that at no time could the writ ever bind the 
land. I f  this were the case, then s. 11 would be useless. T h e sensible 
result would be to say that in light o f s. 11 the writ would bind only 
upon seizure o f the land by the Sheriff. It would follow that the interest 
sold at the S h eriff s sale would be the interest o f the judgm ent debtor at 
the time o f  seizure.
It was not until 1979 that the situation was clarified by further 
amendments to the Memorials and Executions Act.70 T h e effect o f  these 
amendments to sections 15 and 20(1) was that a Sh eriffs  deed to land 
sold under a writ o f fieri facias would convey the interest o f the 
judgm ent debtor in the property “. . . at the time the lands were first 
advertised for sale in a newspaper or The Royal Gazette under s. 
1 3 ( 1 ) . . . ”. One would logically conclude that the time o f first 
advertisement must now be the time when the writ binds land. A lawyer 
acting for the purchaser o f  land may rely on the fact that he has seen no 
such advertisement. Further, since any judgm ent creditor after 
Septem ber 1, 1978 is almost certainly going to register a memorial to 
ensure an early binding o f the property, a lawyer for the purchaser o f 
land may rely on the fact that he found no memorial in the record 
office. However, the only certain methocf is to continue to obtain a 
S h eriffs  Certificate. I f  it reveals a writ in the Sh eriffs  hands, then the 
lawyer must determine whether the property has been advertised and 
thus bound by that writ.
Perfecting Memorials of Judgment
One final question raised by these recent amendments relates to the 
methods now available to perfect the lien o f a judgm ent. T here have 
been no changes with regard to the equitable order for sale. T h e  areas 
o f concern involve the use o f the writ o f  fieri facias to perfect the 
memorial and the problems created by the decision in Tobias v. Bob 
Wilson & Co. No. I . 71 Aside from the problem that the decision treated 
any sale under a writ o f  fieri facias as having no relation to a previously 
registered memorial o f  judgm ent, there is the greater problem that the
T#S .N .B . 1979, c. 40 , ss. 1 and 2.
71(I9 7 4 ) , 8  N .B .R . (2d) 365  (N .B .Q .B .).
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case will be rationalized on statutory provisions such as s. 20(1). I f  this 
happens, then the effect o f  the amendments to s. 15 as well as to s. 20(1) 
will be that the doctrine o f relation back o f title has been abolished 
completely. As noted previously, the basis for the doctrine o f  relation 
back o f title seems to demonstrate that the reliance o f  the Tobias case on 
such a provision was incorrect. It is the meaning o f  the binding o f the 
judgm ent when a memorial is registered that is critical. T h e  property 
cannot later be withdrawn from the operation o f  a writ o f  execution 
with power to reach land which is subsequently issued on that judgm ent. 
As s. 11 has been unaffected, the writ o f fieri facias is still such a writ and 
could be used to perfect the lien o f  a judgm ent. T h erefore, the 
purchaser o f the land at the S h eriffs  sale would get title o f  the 
judgm ent debtor at the time o f registration o f the memorial. Sections 15 
and 20(1) as amended should have no effect whatsoever where the sale 
is being held to perfect the lien o f  a memorial.
PROBLEMS OF PRIORITY 
Renewals
Section 6 o f the Memorials and Executions Act provides as follows:
Every judgm ent or decree o f which a memorial is so registered binds the 
lands o f  the person against whom the judgm ent o r decree was recovered for 
five years from the registry, and after that period, if the judgm ent or decree 
remains unsatisfied, the memorial may be renewed for a further period o f  
five years, with like effect, and so on as often as required.
T h e provision does not specify how the renewal is to be made though 
registration o f a new memorial would presumably be effective. Further, 
there are indications in Devebre v. Austin72 to the effect that registration 
o f  the original memorial will also be a sufficient renewal. What will be 
the effect o f this so called renewed memorial? T h e intention appears to 
be that property will be bound by a judgment only when a current 
memorial is registered; current referring to the five-year term o f a 
memorial. Assume the following fact situation:
7*(1875), 16 N .B .R . 55  (N .B .C .A .). At page 70 , it was stated:
“. .  . it is contem plated that the lien o f  a ju d g em en t created by the registry o f  a m em orial, may be a 
continuing security —  in fact, it becom es a kind o f  statutory m ortgage on the debtor’s land, which binds 
it for Five years, at all events, and may be continued  beyond that tim e by re-registering the m em orial if 
the ju d gem en t cred itor does not wish to en fo rce  it.”
It should be pointed out, however, that 10 Viet. c. 42  provided inter a lia :
. . . that after the exp iration o f  Five years from  and after the tim e o f  the registry o f  any such mem orial 
o f  ju d gem en t shall be o f  no force o r e ffect against lands and C ., as to any purchaser (m ortgagee not 
nam ed) unless a like m em orial is again registered within five years be fo re  the conveyance to any such 
purchaser is duly registered.
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October 1, 1974 —  Memorial registered against J.D .
O ctober 1, 1975 —  X purchases land from J.D .
October 1, 1980 —  Memorial re-registered
O ctober 30, 1980 —  Y purchases land from X
Does Y take title to the land free and clear o f  the lien o f the memorial 
against J .D .?
T h e  answer would seem to be yes. T h e apparent intention o f the 
provision is that the judgm ent will cease to have any effect on the land 
o f the judgm ent debtor after five years. T herefore, if the memorial is 
not renewed before the expiration o f  that five year period, the 
purchaser from J.D . has good title free o f the judgm ent lien. When the 
memorial is renewed, it can only bind land o f the judgm ent debtor in 
the same m anner as the original. T h e original memorial binds the lands 
o f J.D . at the time o f registration. Since the judgm ent debtor no longer 
owns the land on O ctober 1, 1980, the renewed memorial cannot affect 
the purchaser’s title in any way. T o  maintain one’s priority against the 
land o f  a judgm ent debtor in the above situation, the judgm ent creditor 
must ensure that there is not one day beyond the five-year period that 
there is not a current memorial in the Record Office.
Suppose, on the other hand, the judgm ent debtor does not convey 
the property during the term o f the original memorial or the period 
prior to the registration o f the renewed memorial but makes a 
conveyance after the renewal. T h e answer would seem clearly to be that 
the property is bound in the hands o f the purchaser since the renewal is 
to bind in the same manner as the original and at the time o f 
registration o f the renewal the judgm ent debtor still owned the land.
In the case o f  a writ o f  fieri facias, renewal is dealt with by O rder 42, 
r. 2 0 73 o f the Rules o f  Court. This provision is relatively straightforward 
and should cause no problems.
Unregistered Instruments
Assume a judgm ent debtor has conveyed his land prior to the 
registration o f  a memorial but the deed is not registered until after the 
memorial. Does the memorial take priority over the conveyance? An 
argument for this would appear possible on the basis o f  s. 19(1) o f  the 
Registry Act:74
7SA writ o f  execution, if execu ted , shall rem ain in force . .  ., unless renewed in the m anner h erein after 
provided, but such writ may, at any tim e before its exp iration , be renew ed by the party issuing it for 
two years from  the date o f  such renewal, and so on from  tim e to lim e during the continuance o f  the 
renew ed w rit...........
"Registry Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. R-6.
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All instruments may be registered in the registry office for the county in 
which the lands lie, and if not so registered, shall. . .  be deemed fraudulent 
and void against subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration whose 
conveyances are previously registered.
Since the memorial was registered first, why can’t it be said that the 
judgm ent creditor won the race to the registry office and therefore the 
deed would be deemed fraudulent and void as against him? In 
MacDonald v. Royal Bank of Canada75 that argument was rejected. It was 
held that s. 19(1) was not intended to change the basic common law 
principle that a judgm ent creditor cannot obtain any greater right or 
priority to property than the judgment debtor him self had at the time 
the property was bound. At the time the memorial was registered the 
judgm ent debtor had no interest in the property, therefore, the 
memorial had no effect on the land.
Such a situation would be intolerable. No one could rely on good 
record title when purchasing property at the Sh eriffs  sale. Section 19(2) 
o f  the Registry Act appears to solve the problem. It states that such 
unregistered conveyances are deemed fraudulent and void as against a 
judgm ent creditor who had previously registered a memorial unless the 
conveyance is registered within three months o f  its execution. T h e 
purpose o f the section was to permit a purchaser o f land at a sale 
perfecting the lien o f a memorial to rely on record title as long as the 
sale was held more than three months after the memorial was registered. 
Despite its apparent purpose, there appears to be a major problem with 
the effect o f s. 19(2). It is based on the assumption that only instruments 
creating rights can prejudice a judgment creditor. A judgm ent creditor 
will clearly take subject to equities for example that are not created by 
an instrument. One should therefore be extremely cautious before 
relying completely on good record title bound by the memorial.
T h e  same situation existed where the judgm ent creditor used the 
writ o f  fieri facias rather than the memorial. T h e writ when delivered to 
the Sheriff would take subject to unregistered instruments. Section 19(2) 
at one time dealt with this situation by declaring such conveyances 
fraudulent and void as against judgment creditors who delivered a writ 
to the Sheriff unless the conveyance was registered within three months 
o f  its execution. However, section 19(2) has recently been amended in 
an apparent attempt to bring it in line with recent changes regarding the 
writ o f fieri facias binding land. T h e reference to such conveyances being 
deemed fraudulent and void as against judgm ent creditors who have 
delivered a writ o f fieri facias has been dropped. However, the new 
provision does not seem to recognize the possibility o f a writ o f fieri 
facias binding at some other time or the possibility that land can still be 
sold under the writ o f  fieri facias alone. T herefore, a purchaser o f  land 
at a S h e r iff  s sale under a writ o f  fieri facias alone must determine
” [1973] 2 D.L.R. 680 (Ont. C.A.).
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priority according to the common law rules. This means that such a 
purchaser cannot rely on a record title. This is another reason why it is 
not a practical method even though the writ o f  fieri facias used alone 
continues to be available in theory. Purchasers understanding the effect 
o f this amendment will be extremely reluctant to pay for such property.
Creditor’s Relief Act76
T h e basic purpose o f this legislation is stated in s. 3:
Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained there is no priority among 
creditors by execution from The Court o f Queen’s Bench o f New 
Brunswick.77
T h e principle is implemented in s. 4(1) as follows:
W here a Sheriff levies money upon an execution against the property o f  a 
debtor . .  . the money shall thereafter be distributed rateably amongst all 
execution creditors and other creditors whose writs or certificates given under 
this Act were in the Sheriff's hands at the time o f the levy, o r who deliver 
their writs o r certificates to the Sheriff within one month from the entry o f  
notice o f the le v y ;.. . .
Under these provisions, if a judgm ent creditor proceeds to sell land 
under a writ o f  fieri facias alone, he must share rateably with those 
entitled under s. 4 even though he may have been the first judgm ent 
creditor to bind the land.
On the other hand, suppose judgm ent creditor (J.C. No. 1) simply 
registers a memorial. Then he delivers a writ o f  fieri facias to the Sheriff 
with a view to executing against the personal property o f the judgm ent 
debtor. Assume that other memorials have subsequently been registered 
and other writs o f  fieri facias subsequently delivered to the Sheriff. T he 
Sh eriff will execute against all available personal property o f the 
judgment debtor and J.C . No. 1 will be entitled to share in the proceeds 
from these levies under s. 4. In an attempt to satisfy the writs in his 
hands, the Sh eriff will then attempt to sell the land by using the writ 
with the highest priority in order to get the best possible prices. In this 
case, it will be the writ o f  J .C . No. 1. Assuming that such a sale will 
perfect the lien o f the memorial pursuant to the relation back o f title 
doctrine, what would happen to the proceeds o f the sale? One might 
argue that there should be no sharing in these proceeds pursuant to s. 4. 
T h e title being sold was that bound by a judgm ent lien and not an 
execution lien. However, since the machinery used to perfect this 
judgm ent lien was clearly a writ o f  execution, chances o f success on this 
argument are slim.
'•Creditors Relief Act, R .S .N .B . 1973, c. C-33.
77Creditors R elief Act, R .S .N .B . 1973, c. C -33, as am ended S .N .B . 1979 c. 4 1 , s. 32.
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T herefore, J .C . No. 1 should request a return o f the writ before the 
Sh eriff has an opportunity to sell the land thereby perfecting the 
memorial. T h e  right to make such a request exists and is contemplated 
by s. 26 o f The Creditors Relief Act. 78 I f  the writ o f J.C. No. 1 is so 
returned, the Sheriff will only be able to sell under the writ o f judgm ent 
creditor No. 2 (J.C. No. 2). Assuming the sale conveys the title bound by 
J.C . No. 2 ’s memorial, the purchaser at the Sh eriffs  sale will take title 
subject to J.C . No. 1’s memorial. By so ensuring that his memorial is not 
perfected, J.C . No. 1 leaves open several courses o f action by which he 
may retain his priority and not be required to share with other creditors. 
One course o f action J.C . No. 1 may take could be labelled a wait and 
see approach. T here may be a sale by a subsequent execution creditor as 
above or the judgment debtor himself may eventually attempt to sell the 
property. In either case, it will likely be a requisition on title by the 
purchaser that J.C . No. 1’s memorial be discharged. As a result, a direct 
payment to J.C . No. 1 will be made. Such direct payments to a judgm ent 
creditor are outside the Creditors Relief Act and thus provide one means 
o f maintaining priority.
A variation o f this approach would be to wait until there are no 
longer writs or certificates in the Sh eriffs  hands. J .C . No. 1 would then 
issue another w rit o f fieri facias and attempt to perfect the lien o f his 
memorial. T h e danger here is that under s. 4 other creditors have thirty 
days after such a levy to place their writs or certificates in the S h eriff s 
hands. Though this method may result in recovery sooner than waiting 
for direct payment, it is riskier from the standpoint o f maintaining 
priority.
A different approach is for J .C . No. 1, once the writ has been 
returned, to immediately sell the land under an equitable order to 
perfect the lien o f the memorial. T h ere  are two questions that must be 
answered at this stage: first, will the proceeds from a sale pursuant to 
such an order be subject to the provisions o f  the Creditors Relief Act; and 
secondly, when can a judgm ent creditor get such an equitable order? In 
answer to the first question, there are strong arguments that the answer 
is no, the sharing provisions o f the Creditors Relief Act do not apply.79 
Simply having a judgm ent lien come into existence on the registration o f 
a memorial would not be sufficient to make one a “creditor by 
execution” pursuant to s. 3. Further, the memorial is not an execution 
and, therefore, Section 4 would not apply since the Sheriff has not 
levied money “upon an execution”.
71Creditors R elief Act, R .S .N .B . 1973, c. C -33, s. 26 (1 ) provides inter alia :
“. .  . he [the sh eriff) shall not, except on the request o f  the party issuing the writ . .  . return the writ 
until it has been fully sa tisfied .. .
7*T h is also seems to be the conclusion reached by Professor K err in his "R ep o rt on the Legal Rem edies 
o f  the U nsecured C reditor A fter Ju d gem en t" prepared for the Consum er Protection Project, O ctober, 
1976, at 25.
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WiU the equitable order, however, be labelled an execution the 
proceeds from which will be treated as a levy? Will a court take a broad 
policy approach to applying the Creditors Relief Act? On the latter 
question, indications are that the courts will take a very restrictive 
approach to the statute. In Roach v. MacLachlan80 Osier J. stated:
We must be careful not to extend the Creditors Relief Act or the Act respecting 
wages to cases which they do not expressly provide for. They are Acts o f  an 
exceptional and incomplete character, and necessarily so, being, as it were, 
even if intra vires, but crippled substitutes for insolvent legislation. Those, 
therefore, who attempt to take advantage o f  these provisions must shew that 
they are clearly within them .81
Further in McLean v. Allen82 it was stated:
The decisions upon this subject (application o f  the Creditors Relief Act to 
receivers) are conflicting, and for the present, I think I should follow those o f  
the learned Chief Justice o f  the Q ueen’s Bench Division and o f  Common 
Pleas Division, in which my brother Falconbridge has concurred, and hold 
that the provisions o f  the Creditors Relief Act form an exception to the general 
rule, and are not to be extended to cases not actually provided for in that 
Act.83
Although certain remedies made available by the courts of equity 
are generally labelled “equitable execution”, it is not “execution” in the 
strict sense but simply equitable relief. The courts have dealt with the 
application o f the Creditors Relief Act to types of so called “equitable 
execution” other than orders to perfect memorials. In an article 
published in 1962 dealing with equitable changing orders, S.R. Ellis84 
concluded as follows:
While there is nothing in any o f  the above to justify a firm conclusion as to 
whether an Ontario Court would apply the provisions o f  the Creditors Relief 
Act to the charging order, there is sufficient evidence, it is submitted, to 
establish a reasonable probability that those provisions would not be applied 
and that the priority o f  a holder o f  a charging order over other execution  
creditors in proceedings under the Creditors Relief Act would be recognized 85
In the case o f equitable execution by means o f appointment o f a 
receiver, McLean v. Allen, 86 noted earlier, held that the appointment of a
*#( 1892), 19 O.A.R. 496 (Ont. C.A.).
"'Ibid , al 500
"*(1890), 14 P R. 84 (Ont. Q.B.D.).
83Ibid., at 88.
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receiver should not have been declared for the benefit o f all of the 
creditors of the debtor.87 In an Alberta case, Giguere v. Pelon,ss the issue 
was the extent to which a receiving order appointing a Sheriff as 
receiver was subject to sharing provisions equivalent to our Creditors 
Relief Act. It was stated:
T he Sheriff could not treat the money as then being received ‘by him’ in 
respect o f  an execution. They remained moneys received by him as a result o f  
the order appointing him receiver, and the statutory provisions, such as the 
14-day waiting period, did not apply. It is the order made on May 2, 1975, 
that is to be interpreted not the Execution Creditors Act, as far as the $1,500 is 
concerned.89
There appears to be no reason why the same rationale should not 
apply to an equitable order for sale of property to perfect the lien o f a 
memorial. In New Brunswick we have Devebre v. Austin90 in which our 
Court of Appeal protected the priority o f a judgm ent lien which was 
categorized as a “Statutory mortgage” rather than requiring pro rata 
sharing under the Federal Insolvents Act. As stated by the Court, the lien 
and priority o f a memorial can only be abolished by very clear language. 
In an analogous situation, the Court o f Appeal was quite willing to 
permit the judgment creditor to use the equitable order to maintain the 
priority o f his memorial. Why should this not be convincing authority 
today when a judgm ent creditor wishes to retain priority despite the 
Creditors Relief Act ?
Even if a New Brunswick court accepts that the proceeds from the 
sale of the land pursuant to an equitable order are not subject to the 
Creditors Relife Act, it is possible that a court as part of the equitable 
order will require that the proceeds be treated as if they were for the 
benefit of all the creditors. Giguere v. Pelon indicated that such directions 
may be given in the case of receiving orders. In that event, one must 
look only to the terms o f that order for the method of distribution o f 
the proceeds. It is suggested, however, that where a judgment lien is 
involved, particularly in light o f Devebre v. Austin, that our courts would 
not give such directions in the order for sale.
The possible gains as a result o f maintaining priority would certainly 
be sufficient incentive for a judgm ent creditor to attempt this equitable 
order route. When will a judgm ent creditor be entitled to such an
*Tln light o f this decision the Ontario Creditors Relief Act was amended and s. 24 o f the present 
legislation. R.S.O. 1970, c. 97 provides inter alia “Where a judgement creditor obtains the appointment 
o f a receiver by way of equitable execution of property o f his debtor, the receiver shall pay into court 
the money received by him by virtue o f his receivership, and it is subject to s. 23 [providing for money 
in court to be paid to the sheriff and deemed to be levied by him on an execution].”
»*(1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 693 (Alta. S.C., T.D.).
'"‘Ibid., at 696.
*°(I875), 16 N.B.R. 55 (N.B.C.A.).
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order? This depends on whether Massey-Harris Co. v. Whitehead91 is to be 
followed or whether subsequent cases will follow Stevenson J. in Tobias v. 
Bob Wilson fc? Co. No. 2 .92 If Massey-Harris is followed the judgm ent 
creditor would have the option of using the equitable order. If the 
Tobias case is followed, a judgm ent creditor will be required to show an 
impediment to execution at common law. At first glance there will be no 
such impediment. However, one might argue that the confusion caused 
by the decision in Tobias v. Bob Wilson &  Co. No. I 93 creates such an 
impediment as a practical matter. An even stronger argum ent for the 
existence of an impediment would be based on Devebre v. Austin, the 
impediment being the Creditors Relief Act itself.
In conclusion, it seems reasonalbe to argue that a judgm ent creditor 
can obtain an equitable order virtually at any time, thereby 
circumventing the Creditors Relief Act and retaining the priority o f his 
memorial.
SUMMARY AND PRACTICE NOTES
Today the law regarding execution against land can be summarized 
as follows:
(1) Writ o f Fieri Facias Method
This method is still available, at least in theory. The writ would 
appear to bind on first advertisement if delivered to the Sheriff after 
September 1, 1978.
In the case of writs delivered prior to September 1, 1978, they will 
continue to bind the land from the time of delivery as long as they are 
renewed pursuant to O. 42, r. 20.
Practice Note: To be certain, lawyers for purchasers of real 
estate should continue to require a Sheriffs Certificate before 
closing.
Practice Note: Lawyers acting for purchasers o f real estate at a 
Sheriff s sale under a writ of fieri facias alone should realize 
that unregistered instruments as well as other equitable rights 
will have priority despite s. 19(2) of the Registry Act.
• ‘(1923), 51 N.B.R. 282 (N.B.C.A.). 
**(1976), 13 N.B.R. (2d) 21 (N.B.Q.B.). 
t3lbtd.. at 365.
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(2) Memorial Method
The registration o f a memorial would appear to be the only 
practical means o f executing against land today. Two methods are 
available to perfect the lien o f the judgm ent which attaches on 
registration of the memorial:
(i) Writ of Fieri Facias
Despite the problems with Tobias v. Bob Wilson &  Co. and 
amendments to Sections 15 and 20(1) o f the Memorials 
and Executions Act, properly understood, the doctrine o f 
relation back o f title continues to apply.
(ii) Equitable O rder for Sale
This method should be available virtually at the option 
o f the judgm ent creditor in light of Massey-Harris Co. v. 
Whitehead. Tobias v. Bob Wilson Co. No. 2 does, 
however, raise the question o f whether one may still be 
required to exhaust his legal remedies. Such an order 
gives a judgm ent creditor a reasonable possibility of 
evading the sharing provisions of the Creditors Relief Act.
RECOMMENDATION FOR REFORM
This area o f the law of execution must be clarified, and this can 
only be completely accomplished by legislation action. There is no need 
to retain two separate and distinct methods of executing against land. 
The fact that two methods exist today is simply a result of historical 
development. Recent amendments have tended to eliminate the writ of 
fieri facias method as a practical matter and this method is now more a 
source of confusion then anything else. These amendments have only 
gone part way, and further steps must be taken to eliminate it. U nder a 
new system, it should be clear that land can only be bound if a memorial 
is registered in the appropriate Registry Office. Section 11 of the 
Memorials and Executions Act must be amended so that land can no longer 
be seized and sold under the writ of fieri facias as personal property. 
Also, amendments may have to be made to other statutes such as the 
Garnishees Act94 to make it clear that no writ of execution binds land.
When such steps are taken to eliminate any effect of the writ o f fieri 
facias on land, the memorial method must be clarified. If s. 11 is 
amended as suggested, then the writ o f  fieri facias will no longer be 
available to perfect the judgment lien. Only writs of execution which 
reach land can perfect the lien. The only practical method for perfection 
would be the equitable order for sale. Such an equitable order would
•*Gamishee Act. 1973 R.S.N.B., c. G-2.
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presumably be available on request, though this should be expressly 
stated in a statute. Also, conditions precedent such as having all personal 
property sold first, should be clearly stated. It might, however, be better 
to have a more efficient and cheaper method o f perfecting the 
memorial, something analogous to the w rit o f fieri facias method with 
relation back of title. It may be advisable to create a new special writ or 
order for this sole purpose. As long as the equitable order for sale 
method is available, the legislation should be clarified to indicate clearly 
whether or not the proceeds from the sale must be distributed pro rata 
under the Creditors Relief Act.
In the absence of any legislative action, the best that can be hoped 
for from the standpoint of a judgm ent creditor is that the Court of 
Appeal will overrule both decisions in Tobias v. Bob Wilson &  Co. This 
would remove much of the present uncertainty and permit the 
judgm ent creditor to perfect the lien o f his judgm ent in a convenient 
and efficient m anner by a sale under a writ of fieri facias. Further, a 
judgm ent creditor would then have a better opportunity of attempting 
an equitable sale o f the property to maintain priority. Only time will tell 
what the next step will be, by either the Courts or Legislature.
